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Loney: Appellate Division, Fourth Department: People v. Gibson

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FOURTH DEPARTMENT
People v. Gibson'
(decided June 11, 2010)
Jeffrey D. Gibson appealed from a judgment of the Supreme
Court, Erie County, where he was convicted of robbery in the first
degree, based on DNA evidence which, unbeknownst to him, the
police acquired from a discarded cigarette butt.2 The acquired DNA
evidence was used to link him to evidence found at the scene of a
robbery he allegedly committed.3 The defendant asserted that
because he "was in custody on an unrelated charge for which he was
represented by counsel,"' the police officer's offer of "a cigarette for
the purpose of obtaining DNA evidence from his saliva in an effort to
link him to the instant robbery"s violated both his privilege against
self-incrimination and the "indelible right to counsel" 6 it invokes
under both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 6 of the New York Constitution.' The appellate
court affirmed the decision of the lower court and allowed the
admission of the DNA evidence at trial.8 The court concluded that
the DNA evidence ascertained from the cigarette butt was "real and
physical evidence" as opposed to "testimonial and communicative
902 N.Y.S.2d 289 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2010).
Id. at 290.
3 id.
2

4id

5 Id
6 Gibson, 902 N.Y.S.2d at 290. See also People v. Bing, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (N.Y.
1990) (discussing that the right to counsel in New York attaches in two instances-at the
commencement of formal proceedings and when "uncharged individuals in [police] custody
... have retained or requested an attorney").
7 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in relevant part: "No
person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . ."
Article I, section 6 of the New York Constitution states, in pertinent part: "No person shall
be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself.. .
Gibson, 902 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
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evidence," and thus there was no contravention of the defendant's
federal or state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, nor
the derivative right to counsel it invokes. 9
While in police custody on a bench warrant for an unrelated
charge for which he was represented by an attorney, the defendant,
Mr. Gibson, asked to speak to an investigator with whom he had past
dealings.10 Unbeknownst to the defendant, the same investigator had
knowledge of a prior robbery that he suspected the defendant was
linked to." The investigator did not only possess knowledge of the
robbery, but the police department possessed the DNA of the
perpetrator which was extracted from a knitted cap left at the crime
scene. 12
The knitted cap was found by the police in the backyard of a
homeowner, approximately 200 feet from the crime scene. 13
Reportedly, a relatively short time after the robbery occurred, the
defendant's girlfriend was observed walking within close proximity
of the crime scene.' 4 Shortly thereafter, about an hour or so, the
defendant and his girlfriend were seen walking together about onehalf mile from the robbery." Even though the perpetrator's face was
covered during the robbery, the general description of the perpetrator
was said to match that of the defendant, Mr. Gibson.16
It is very unlikely that the defendant was aware of the
incriminating information the investigator possessed when he
requested to meet with him. Nevertheless, despite this contention, a
conversation ensued between the defendant and the investigator. 17
During that conversation the investigator offered the defendant a
cigarette, the remains of which were surreptitiously seized and later
used to charge and convict him.' 8 The dissent asserted that it was the
intention of the investigator to offer and subsequently use the remains
of the cigarette to acquire the defendant's DNA solely for purposes of

10

Id.
Id

12

Id
id

" Gibson, 902 N.Y.S.2d at 291.
14 id
15

Id.

16 Id.

SId. at 290.
1s

Gibson, 902 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
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linking him to the robbery.' 9 The dissent further asserted that the
investigator used his knowledge of the defendant's smoking habit,
and his inaccessibility to cigarettes, as a manipulative device to
eventually acquire the defendant's DNA. 20 Whether this is true or
not is unknown. Yet, what is true is that the investigator made an
The
offer that the defendant accepted to his disadvantage. 21
22
DNA.
by
the
police
for
later
tested
discarded cigarette remains were
And because the DNA on the cigarette matched the DNA found on
the knitted cap, the defendant, Mr. Gibson, was charged and
eventually convicted of robbery in the first degree.23
Because no formal charges were brought against Gibson
pursuant to the robbery case, the appellate court decided that his right
to counsel attached based on the formal proceedings and bench
warrant from his unrelated charge.24 But to the detriment of the
defendant, the attachment of this right served no consolation. The
court held that the DNA constituted "real and physical evidence"the type of evidence that is not afforded protection under the New
York or United States Constitutions.2 5
The court in Gibson adopted the reasoning of People v.
Hager26 which asserted that unless the evidence communicates or
testifies to the defendant's subjective knowledge or thought process,
it is not self-incriminatory.2 7 Therefore, as the court held that there
was no contravention of the defendant's privilege against selfincrimination, it eventually followed that his derivative right to
counsel was not violated.28
Pursuant to the reasoning of Schmerber v. California,29 the
majority held that there could be no viable right to counsel claim
where the defendant was not entitled to assert his privilege against

19 Id. at 292 (Green, J., dissenting).
id

20

21 Id. at 290 (majority opinion).
22 id.
23

Gibson, 902 N.Y.S.2d at 290.

24

id.

25 Id. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of Schmerber v.
UnitedStates.
26 505 N.E.2d 237 (N.Y.
1987).
27 Id. at 238.
28 Gibson, 902 N.Y.S.2d
at 291.
29 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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self-incrimination as appurtenant to the Fifth Amendment.3 0
Reasoning by analogy, the majority concluded that the DNA acquired
from the surreptitious taking of the defendant's discarded cigarette
did not constitute a constitutional violation under either the Fifth
Amendment or article I, section 6 of the New York State
Constitution.31 As a result, there was no need to suppress the DNA
evidence. 32
The majority in Gibson accused the dissent of reading too far
into the matter of when the right to counsel attaches. The majority
asserted that if the court were to welcome such a broad interpretation,
as the one suggested by the dissent, any "person stopped by the
police" who was being represented on unrelated charges, or who
would request an attorney, could preclude the use of evidence
obtained as a result of field sobriety or chemical tests.34 As a result,
the majority rejected this view because it would almost always
preclude the prosecution from securing a conviction.
The dissenting opinion in Gibson suggested that the
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, together with his
right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure, was violated
within the context of both the State and Federal Constitutions; thus
the evidence should have been suppressed.3 6 The dissent contended
that as the defendant was represented by counsel on an unrelated
charge, the police had no right to interrogate him on any other matter
absent the presence of his attorney.37 The dissent acknowledged that
the defendant was not required to submit to interrogation because his
counsel was not present and, moreover, the detective was aware of
this."
The dissent asserted that the detective's behavior
conceptualized the idea of "interrogation," as discussed in People v.
Kollar,3 9 as the detective used his knowledge of the defendant being
30
'
32

Gibson, 902 N.Y.S.2d at 290-91. See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
Gibson, 902 N.Y.S.2d at 291.
id.

n Id.
34 id.
36 Gibson, 902 N.Y.S.2d at 292.
38SId
idn

39 See infra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
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a smoker and their prior relationship as a means to knowingly acquire
evidence to incriminate him. 4 0 Lastly, the dissent also proposed that
even if the majority were to differ from the aforementioned
precedents, the State could only ascertain a DNA sample from the
defendant in the presence of a court order or if the defendant
consented to giving the sample absent coercion. 4 1 Such reasoning
maintains the defendant's right to be secure in his person against
Nevertheless, as the
unreasonable searches and seizures. 42
defendant's right to counsel arose from the unrelated charge, the
detective was not supposed to proffer a request for the sample in the
absence of the defendant's counsel.4 3
Great disparity exists between the majority and dissent's
application of the New York jurisprudential standard with regard to
the privilege and the indelible right to counsel it invokes. Yet the
Supreme Court's explication of a defendant's privilege against selfincrimination and the right to counsel it invokes was cogently set
forth in the seminal case Miranda v. Arizona." In Miranda, the
Court acknowledged that custodial interrogation, absent a nonadversarial party to the accused, creates inherently compelling
pressures which in turn catalyzes the accused to proffer a forced
confession.4 5 The procedural emanations from Miranda,the "right to
remain silent" and the "right to counsel," were the safeguards
Gibson, 902 N.Y.S.2d at 292.
See People v. Dail, 894 N.Y.S.2d 78, 80 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2010); In re Abe A., 437
N.E.2d 265, 266 (N.Y. 1982). In order for the State to obtain a court order for a blood
sample they must establish the following:
(1) [P]robable cause to believe the suspect has committed the crime, (2)
a "clear indication" that relevant material evidence will be found, and (3)
the method used to secure it is safe and reliable. In addition, the issuing
court must weigh the seriousness of the crime, the importance of the
evidence to the investigation and the unavailability of less intrusive
means of obtaining it, on the one hand, against concern for the suspect's
constitutional right to be free from bodily intrusion on the other. Only if
this stringent standard is met, as we conclude it was here, may the
intrusion be sustained.
Id.
42 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 12.
43 See People v. Loomis, 682 N.Y.S.2d 743, 743-44 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1998) (affirming
a decision in which evidence found in defendant's home was suppressed as the defendant
gave the police consent to search his home when police were precluded from requesting such
consent as they knew defendant could not proffer such consent in absence of his attorney).
4 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
45 Id. at 467.
40
41
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implemented to affect the Court's incessant desire to preserve the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.4 6
The right to counsel attaches at the commencement of
criminal proceedings. 47 Nevertheless, Miranda established that the
privilege against self-incrimination, which invokes the derivative
right to counsel, extends outside of criminal proceedings and into the
setting of "custodial interrogation" of the defendant by law
enforcement or a prosecuting attorney.4 8 Moreover, the privilege
"serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of
action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to
incriminate themselves."4 9 As a result, the Court put procedural
guidelines in place to assure that the privilege is properly
effectuated. 50 Those guidelines included: (1) an explicit statement
from the interrogator(s) to the person in custody that they have the
right to remain silent; (2) an additional and explicit warning that
should he or she decide to act alternatively, all statements made can
and shall be used against him or her; and lastly (3) the right to
counsel, not only preceding custodial interrogation, but during it as
Miranda reinforced the contention that once the Fifth
well."
46

Id. at 468.

Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (finding that criminal proceedings include
preliminary hearing, information, or indictment).
48 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
The Court defined custodial interrogation as the
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444.
49 Id. at 467.
47

s0 See id. at 469-70.

51 Id. In addition to the explicit statement of one's right to remain silent, the Court was
adamant in the belief that an attorney should be present during a custodial interrogation, as it
ruled:
[T]he right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable
to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we
delineate today. Our aim is to assure that the individual's right to choose
between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the
interrogation process. A once stated warning, delivered by those who
will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself suffice to that end among
those who most require knowledge of their rights. A mere warning
given by the interrogators is not alone sufficient to accomplish that end
.... Thus, the need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege
comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to
questioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning in
which the defendant so desires.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-70 (emphasis added). The Court also asserted the idea that
counsel being present during the interrogation process: (1) enhances the integrity of the fact
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Amendment privilege is invoked, all interrogation must cease. 52
Nevertheless, even though the privilege is preserved in the form of
Miranda warnings, an accused may derogate away from invocation
of the privilege and waive his right to counsel.
In Schmerber v. California,5 4 the Supreme Court emphasized
that the Fifth Amendment privilege protects the accused only from
being "compelled to testify against himself [or herself], or otherwise
provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative
nature."s5 The Court in Schmerber concluded that a distinction must
be drawn between the states' use of physical or moral compulsion to
obtain communication from an individual and the use of one's person

finding process as counsel's presence assures that whatever the defendant/accused
communicates to the police will be correctly communicated to the prosecution at trial; (2)
decreases the probability of police coercion; and (3) provides the defendant/accused with a
secure environment in which he can tell his story under otherwise intense and compelling
conditions without the fear and anxiety that the interrogation process normally brings. Id. at
466, 470.
52 Id. at 473-74.
5 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 488 (1981) (discussing that if a party waives the
right to counsel, the waiver must be voluntary and constitute a knowing and "intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege ... [which] must depend, in
each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused") (internal citations omitted). See
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010), as the Court opined that although
there has been no clear holding establishing whether the same standard is applicable for the
right to remain silent (as to the right of counsel), the same standards apply as the two
privileges are combative against compulsory self-incrimination. See also Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (discussing that should an accused waive either his right to remain
silent or his right to counsel it must be done: (1) voluntarily in the sense that is was the
product of free deliberate choice and absent any form of coercion, intimidation, or deception;
and (2) it must be made intelligently and knowingly as to say the accused must know of the
rights that is being abandoned and that he is actually abandoning it); Michigan v. Mosley,
423 U.S. 96, 103-05 (1975). Consistent with the right of the accused to remain silent is the
accused's power to control the length of the interrogation, the content of what is discussed,
as well as the time in which the questioning occurs. Id. at 103-04. Therefore, should he
deviate from his right after he previously invoked it, the Court has held that the admissibility
of the statements ascertained are dependent on whether law enforcement has "scrupulously
honored" the defendant's right to remain silent. Id. at 104. Some of the factors, though
neither definite nor dispositive, reviewed by the Court to determine whether the right was
"scrupulously honored" are: the cessation of the initial interrogation once the accused
invoked the right; the amount of time that has elapsed between the initial invocation of the
right and the subsequent interrogatories; the relation of the interrogatories to the actual crime
in question; whether a new set of Miranda warnings were read to the accused; and whether
the accused understood them. Id. at 104-05.
54 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
"

Id. at 761.
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as evidence.16 In acknowledging such a distinction, the Court held
that only testimonial and communicative evidence, and not
compulsion of an individual to produce "real or physical evidence,"
was afforded protection under the Self-Incrimination Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.5 7 The court reasoned that if the evidence was not
testimonial in nature, but instead was real or physical, then the
privilege did not apply and the absence of the presence of counsel
during the procurement of the DNA was irrelevant.
Prior to Schmerber's explication as to what evidence can be
deemed self-incriminatory, there was Holt v. United States.5 9 Holt
plainly stated that "compelling a man . . . to be witness against

himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as
evidence when it may be material."6 0 One may assume that this
holding is what bore the subsequent distinction found in
Schmerber-that the Fifth Amendment privilege only extended to
"testimonial and communicative evidence" as opposed to "real and
physical evidence." 6 ' However, it is without doubt that at this point
in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence that the Court provided the
exception to the valued privilege against self-incrimination.
In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 62 the Court acknowledged that the
privilege did not protect a defendant from being compelled to
produce "real or physical evidence." 63 In order for evidence to be
afforded the protections of the privilege, it must assert
communications that in and of itself "explicitly or implicitly, relate a
factual assertion or disclose information," and therefore put the
accused in a position where he could incriminate himself.6
56 Id. at 763 (citing Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910)).

57

Id. at 764-65.
Id. at 766.

' 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
' Id. at 252-53.

61 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
62

496 U.S. 582 (1990).

63 Id. at 589 (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988)).

6 Id at 594. The Court asserted that the purpose of the privilege was to spare the accused
from having to reveal, whether explicitly or implicitly, knowledge about the offense to the
government. Id. They further asserted that the privilege was founded and premised on their
unwillingness to subject the accused to what they believed was a "trilemma of selfaccusation, perjury or contempt" that if allowed would result in a non-favorable inquisitorial
system of criminal justice versus the accusatorial system that they prefer. Id. at 595 n.8.
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Therefore, because DNA merely constitutes the chemical analysis of
the physiological make up of a defendant, and does not proffer any
communications of the subjective cognitions of a defendant, Fifth
Amendment protections are inapplicable.6 5
Gilbert v. California66 was actually decided a year after
Miranda and held that hand writing exemplars are forms of physical
evidence, as they serve to identify a physical characteristic.
According to the Court, the use of one's hand writing and voice are
means used to facilitate communication. 68 However, as long as the
content of what was said and/or written was not testimonial and
communicative in nature, the exemplars can be used to identify
physical characteristics of the defendant, thus precluding him from
the protections of the privilege.69
Wilson v. Collins70 and United States v. Zimmerman7 more
specifically dealt with DNA evidence. In following the precedent of
Muniz, both cases held that DNA did not implicate the privilege
against self-incrimination as it was physical evidence.12 Collins
further held that a DNA sample was analogous to fingerprints,
photographs, or any other type of physical evidence that identified
the accused."
Based on the progeny of cases that has succeeded Miranda, it
is evident that the implemented procedural safeguards serve as
impediments between the subjective cognitions of the accused and
his accuser. Thus, the only way that an accused can subject himself
to self-incrimination is if he is compelled to relinquish his right to his
Miranda serves as the prohibition against such
thoughts.
compulsion. Similarly, New York case law has created procedural
impediments within its own constitutional jurisprudence in an effort
to afford New York citizens the same, if not greater protections.
See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765 (finding that the results of the DNA test depended on
chemical analysis alone and thus was not incriminating to the defendant because it was not
testimony or some evidence relating to a communicative act or writing by the defendant).
6 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
67 Id. at 266-67.
61 Id. at 266.
65

69

Id.

517 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2008).
" 514 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2007).
72 Collins, 517 F.3d at 431 (citing Zimmerman, 514 F.3d
at 855).
73 See id.
70
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The privilege against self-incrimination is valued in the State
of New York, and thus has developed separate from its federal
counterpart.7 4 The Fifth Amendment and article I, section 6 of the
New York State Constitution confer similar rights to the accused.
Nevertheless, as the right to counsel is deemed a "cherished
principle" in New York State jurisprudence, "[o]ur decisional law has
advanced this principle by holding that the State constitutional right
to counsel attaches indelibly in two [instances]." 7 6
The right to counsel may attach when formal judicial
proceedings are commenced (i.e. post indictment, arraignment, or
upon the filing of an accusatory instrument). Should it not attach in
the former instance, it attaches when an uncharged individual has
retained a lawyer in the matter in question or while in custody,
requests a lawyer to represent him or her in the matter in question.
In furtherance of this principle, a greater protection was established.
The court in People v. Burd 79 actually referred to this protection as a
"workable, comprehensible, bright line rule."80 The rule states that
"once a defendant in custody on a particular matter is representedby
or requests counsel, custodial interrogation about any subject,
whether related or unrelated to the charge upon which representation
is sought or obtained, must cease." 8 ' The presence of an attorney
serves as a mitigating factor between the likelihood of an accused to
self-incriminate due to his vulnerability in an overwhelming
environment, and the coercive power of the state to compel an
accused to do so. 82 Furthermore, People v. Kollar83 stated that
interrogation was not only limited to "express questioning, but also
[included] any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the

police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect."8 4
74 People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612, 615 (N.Y. 1978).

7 See supratext accompanying note 7.
76 People v. Ramos, 780 N.E.2d 506, 509 (N.Y. 2002).
7 Settles, 385 N.E.2d at 615.
78 Ramos, 780 N.E.2d at 509.
7 690 N.E.2d 854 (N.Y. 1997).
so Id. at 856.

81 Id. at 859 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 855.

760 N.Y.S.2d 449 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2003).
8 Id. at 451 (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)) (internal quotation
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Analogous to the precedents of Schmerber and Gilbert,Hager
discussed how evidence must be distinguished in order to warrant
In Hager, the defendant struck a
Fifth Amendment protections.
pedestrian and fled the scene of the crime.8 6 When the police finally
apprehended him, they smelled alcohol on his breath and
subsequently transported him to the central testing headquarters.
The defendant agreed to take several field sobriety tests that he later
failed due to his inebriation. Even though the defendant contended
that the evidence should be suppressed as no Miranda warnings were
given prior to the administration of the tests, thus contravening his
Fifth Amendment rights, the court denied his claim. 89 The court
reasoned that because real and physical evidence did not
communicate or reveal the defendant's subjective knowledge or
thought process, it therefore did not invoke protections under the
Fifth Amendment.90
The disparity between New York State and federal
jurisprudence is greatly, if not entirely, seen in the right to counsel.
Similar to federal constitutional jurisprudence, in New York the right
to counsel attaches at the commencement of the criminal
proceeding. 91 However, the criminal proceedings may commence
upon the issuance of a warrant. 92 As a result, unlike the Federal
Constitution, the New York State Constitution does not permit
interrogation of a suspect absent counsel even if the arrest was made
pursuant to a warrant. 93 In extraordinary circumstances, though it
does not attach automatically, a right to counsel may even attach in
delayed proceedings.9 4
Another factor to be distinguished is that only in New York
State does the indelible right attach while an uncharged individual in
marks omitted).
" 505 N.E.2d 237, 238 (N.Y. 1987).
86 Id.
87 Id
88 Id
89 id

9 Hager, 505 N.E.2d at 238. The court stated that "[p]hysical performance tests do not
reveal a person's subjective knowledge or thought processes but, rather, exhibit a person's
degree of physical coordination for observation by police officers." Id.
" Bing, 558 N.E.2d at 1015.
92 People v. Harris, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1054 (N.Y. 1991).
SId.
94 People v. Hopkins, 449 N.E.2d 419, 420 (N.Y. 1983).
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custody has either retained or requested an attorney. 95 At this point, a
police officer must refrain from questioning the individual, or should
they not refrain, any information that they may ascertain will be
inadmissible. 96
Nevertheless, because this right to counsel can arise
when an individual has actually retained a lawyer, it
cannot be said to arise under the privilege against selfincrimination alone; instead . .. this right is rooted in

"the privilege against self incrimination, the right to be
aided by counsel and due process."9 7
Both the United States Constitution and the New York State
Constitution afford many privileges to all of those whom they
govern-one of the most important is the privilege to not subject
oneself to self-incrimination.9 ' Even though the right to counsel9 9 is
a mandated entitlement coupled with both the Fifth Amendment and
New York State Constitution article I, section 6 privilege, the
defendant-appellant, Jeffrey D. Gibson, asserted that he was divested
of both the privilege and entitlement. "o Defendant-appellant Gibson
contended that the lower court erred in its decision not to suppress
DNA, which unbeknownst to him, was ascertained from his
discarded cigarette which was subsequently used to link him to a
This contention was premised on what the
prior robbery. 10 '
defendant-appellant believed was a contravention of his right to
counsel-a right invoked by one's privilege against selfincrimination under both the United States and New York State
Bing, 558 N.E.2d at 1015.
Id.
9' Burdo, 690 N.E.2d at 857 (dissenting opinion) (internal citations omitted).
9
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in relevant part: "No
person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . "
Article I, section 6 of the New York Constitution states, in pertinent part: "No person shall
be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself. . . ."
9
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (discussing that a suspect or defendant's right to counsel,
while in custodial interrogation, is one of the methods employed in order to assure that the
party in custody is not divested of the constitutional safeguard provided by the Fifth
Amendment); see also Settles, 385 N.E.2d at 615 (discussing that absent an attorney an
unsophisticated indicted or arraigned defendant may relinquish his or her privilege and
succumb to "compulsory self-incrimination").
'" Gibson, 902 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
9
96

101 Id.
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Constitutions.1 02
The majority opinion erred in its application of the law to the
defendant's claim. It is without dispute that the DNA evidence
acquired was "real and physical evidence." Nevertheless, it was
wrongfully acquired as the defendant was already represented by
counsel on an unrelated charge and thus should not have been
interrogated by the investigator.10 3 The majority reasoned that should
the court adopt this approach,
[Any] person stopped by the police on suspicion of
driving while intoxicated could refuse without
consequence to submit to field sobriety tests [or] ...
chemical test if he or she happened to be represented
by counsel on pending charges or, indeed, if he or she
simply asked for an attorney. Because under those
circumstances the right to counsel previously would
have attached or would thereby be invoked upon the
request for an attorney, the refusal of the suspect to
consent to the tests could not be used against him or
her at trial, thus making it virtually impossible in
many cases for the prosecution to obtain a
conviction.'04
Indeed, the court may view this as a viable concern. However, it is
not viable enough to supersede the precedential guidelines that the
court, itself, has put into place regarding self-incrimination and the
right to counsel. Most importantly, it is not viable enough to
supersede the purpose of the both Sixth Amendment and article I,
section 6, to provide a protective mechanism for the defendant in the
adversarial criminal process. Ironically, the courts clear manipulation
of New York jurisprudence, with regard to self-incrimination and the
right to counsel it invokes, appears to have misconstrued this
purpose.
The purpose of article I, section 6 of the New York
Constitution is to provide a procedural mechanism for the
defendant-one in which guarantees him a fair and just trial.
Moreover, the purpose of precedent that surrounds it is to facilitate
102

id

'03 Burdo, 690 N.E.2d at 855.
'
Gibson, 902 N.Y.S.2d at 291.
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and effectuate the guarantee-not to secure convictions for the
prosecution. As a result, the reasoning of the Gibson court was not
only counterintuitive and contrary to the court's precedent, but it was
also a miscarriage of justice on behalf of the defendant.
In an effort to effect one area of justice, the court divested the
defendant of his rights provided by another. If the court was truly
concerned that intoxicated drivers would purposely refuse to take
field sobriety tests, absent sanction, and invoke their right to counsel
as a protective device to avoid being charged and convicted of
driving under the influence, it should have submitted this concern to
the New York legislature, as a matter of this gravity is within the
state's police power to regulate. Ironically, as viable as this concern
may be, it is not appurtenant to the facts of the present case because
defendant Gibson was neither intoxicated nor a driver when his DNA
was surreptitiously seized by the investigator. Instead, he was a
defendant that the detective knew was represented by counsel on an
unrelated charge, and thus a defendant whom should not have been
interrogated. 10

The detective's behavior constituted interrogation because he
used that act of giving the defendant the cigarette as a mechanism to
elicit the defendant's use and later discard of the cigarette solely with
the intent of acquiring the DNA from the remains to incriminate
him. 106 The defendant did not voluntarily or spontaneously give his
DNA, a product of his person, to the detective to use as he so pleased.
Instead, the defendant's DNA was surreptitiously seized as a result of
an "impermissible interrogation."10 7 Based on the foregoing reason
the defendant's DNA should have been suppressed as New York state
jurisprudence precludes an accused, represented by counsel, from
being interrogated on related or unrelated matters in absence of the

Burdo, 690 N.E.2d at 855.
'0 See Kollar, 760 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
107 Id. The court defined impermissible interrogation
as:
words or actions the police knew or should have known would prompt
an incriminating response, any knowledge the police may have about a
suspect's particular susceptibility is important in determining whether
l0

the particular conduct was inappropriate. . . . [Furthermore,]

the

definition of impermissible interrogation "focuses primarily on the
perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police."
Id. (citing Innis, 466 U.S. at 301, 302 n.8).
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accused's counsel. 0 8 It is for this reason the court erred in its
decision.
The Gibson court's complete deviation away from the
jurisprudential standard set forth in Burdo does not only show its
disregard for precedents that it has created, but a total disregard for
the judicial process. 10 9
In Weeks v. UnitedStates, "o the Supreme Court opined that:
The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the
guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not
to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
established by years of endeavor and suffering which
have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental
law of the land."'
Gibson 's holding, without doubt, showed its disrespect for this
longstanding principle.
Whether it appears in the presence of a federal safeguard or a
state safeguard, the privilege against self-incrimination is an essential
one. A man's thoughts are one of his most precious possessions, if
not the most precious, and should be rightfully protected as such.
And even in cases, such as this one, where the cognitions of the
accused are not the subject of his detriment, the constitutional
safeguards put in place should be followed to procure the use of the
privilege should the need ever arise. This decision has derogated
away from the very purpose exemplified by Miranda-thepurpose of
preventing the subjugation of the accused into the will of his or her
examiners.112
Nevertheless, as New York State constitutional
jurisprudence continues to evolve, adequate protective devices will

Burdo, 690 N.E.2d at 855.
[in Rogers] . . . emphasized that since defendant was represented on
the charge on which he was held in custody, he could not be interrogatedin the absence of
counsel on any matter, whether related or unrelated to the subject of the representation"
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
110 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
"' Id at 393.
108

109 Id. ("Our holding

112

Miranda,348 U.S. at 457.
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continue to be employed from preventing another decision to come
out like this again.
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